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NOTES
EFFECT OF DELAY IN PASSING ON INSURANCE
APPLICATIONS
A pertinent development in the last decade of American insurance
law has been the growth of the doctrine that an insurer is vested
with the duty of passing upon applications for insurance within a
reasonable time. The origin of the doctrine is traceable to the decisions
of Carter v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co.,' Duffie v. Bankers' Life
Ass'n. of Des Moines,2 and Boyer v. State Farmers' Mutual Hail
Insurance Co.3 These cases were among the first to assert that an insurer must act upon applications for insurance promptly or suffer the
consequences of its dilatory conduct.4
Plaintiffs who previously sought relief against an insurer in this
type of action were summarily dismissed from the courts because of
their failure to establish an ex contractu liability. The application being
a mere offer, no actionable contract of insurance could be inferred
from the insurer's neglect to act upon it; the legal effect of the insurer's
silence was a rejection rather than an acceptance of the application.5
The Carter, Duffle, and Boyer cases circumvented this legal pitfall
by imposing a duty which was not contractual but which sounded in
tort. The challenge had been given, and other courts were quick to
answer it.6 The adoption by the courts of the principles underlying
recovery in these early cases has been swift and revolutionary in
effect; today precedent is not lacking for imposing upon the insurer
the duty to act promptly upon applications for life, hail, fire, health and
accident, automobile liability, and other types of insurance policies.
However, this new conception of an insurer's duty has not achieved
its niche in American jurisprudence without a struggle. Even today
some jurisdictions cling tenaciously to the doctrine that there can be
no recovery in the absence of an ex contractu liability." Where recov11 Hawaiian Rep. 69 (1897). "
2 160 Iowa 191, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913).
286 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912).
4These cases are considered by some writers as embodying the moral justification for recovery.
5 Stewart v. Helvetia Swiss Fire Ins. Co., 102 Cal. 218, 36 Pac. 410 (1894);
Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Stickler, 75 Ind. App. 191, 115 N.E. 691 (1916); McLendon v. Woodmen of the World, 106 Tenn. 695, 64 S.W. 36 (1901); Haden v.
Farmers and Merchants Fire Ass'n., 80 Va. 683 (1885).
6 Within the last decade the following jurisdictions have adopted this new conception of an insurer's duty to those from whom it solicits its business:
Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.
The foregoing are the jurisdictions where recovery has been allowed.
?Among the jurisdictions where recovery has been denied under any theory
are Arkansas, Connecticut, Minnesota, Mississippi and West Virginia. As
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ery is permitted at least three major theories for predicating liability
upon the insurer prevail: (a) Tort. The tort theory, favorite of the
courts, simply imposes a duty upon the insurer to act upon an application within a reasonable time. Failure so to act is negligence, from
which flows damages for the plaintiff when actual loss is established.
The theory has been vigorously assailed on the ground that the common law recognizes no duty upon the insurer to act promptly, and that
the duty should be created only by legislative action. (b) Franchise
theory. The insurer's duty to act promptly is justified on the ground
that the insurer acts under the franchise from the state, given solely
because the public interest requires that the citizens of the state be
indemnified against certain specific contingencies0 (c) Quasi-contract.
The Wisconsin court in Kukuska v. Home Mutual Hail-Tornado Insurance Co.,'0 awarded damages to a plaintiff who had made application for hail insurance and whose growing crops had been destroyed
by hail on the day that notice of rejection of the application had been
given. Approximately twenty-three days had elapsed between solicitation of the application and notice of rejection. The delay was held
unreasonable in view of the imminence of loss by hail, the brevity of
the hazardous period, and the fact that the necessity for prompt action
in this type of insurance transaction is common knowledge. A duty
resting upon the insurance company to act upon the application within
a reasonable time was proclaimed by the court. But the duty was not
precisely labelled, the court refusing to commit itself further than to
typical cases see Savage v. Prudential Ins. Co., 154 Miss. 89, 121 So. 487
(1929), and Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 Conn. 526, 165 Atl. 686
(1933).
"This court as presently constituted cannot perceive how a tort liability can
be predicated until and unless some legal duty devolved upon the insurance
company to either accept or reject an application for insurance within a reasonable time. This legal duty must arise by virtue of some express provision of the statute or from the contractual relation existing between the parties, whereby a legal, not a moral duty, devolves upon the insurance company
to act within a reasonable time upon an application submitted." Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Brady, 94 Ind. App. 651, 174 N.E. 99 (1930). See as cases
allowing recovery in tort: De Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo.
146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924) ; Security Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac.
151 (1922); Dyer v. Missouri State Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac.
346 (1925).
9"The legislative policy, in granting this (the franchise from the state), proceeds upon the theory that chartering such association is in the interest of
the public to the end that indemnity on specific contingencies shall be provided those who are eligible and desire it, and for their protection the state
regulates, inspects, and supervises their business. Having solicited applications
for insurance, and having obtained them and received payment of the fees
or premiums exacted, they are bound either to furnish the indemity the state
has authorized them to furnish, or decline so to do within such reasonable
time as will enable them to act intelligently and advisedly thereon, or suffer
the consequences flowing from their neglect so to do." Duffie v. Bankers' Life
Ass'n., supra note 2.
10204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W. 403 (1931).
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comment:" "It seems to be more in accord with ordinary legal concepts to say that it is a quasi-contractual duty." The Kukuska case
indicates that the Wisconsin court is wary of an outright submission
to any single theoretical basis for granting relief, but seems more concerned with the justice of the particular case presented for its review.
In Wallace v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., - a subsequent
Wisconsin case, plaintiff-beneficiary sued for damages caused by
defendant company's dilatory conduct in passing upon an application
for a life policy. The company's medical report disclosed that the
applicant had been afflicted with leakage of the heart at the date of
application for the policy. Plaintiff's claim to damages was summarily
dismissed by the court as being purely speculative. The court refused
to invoke the principles underlying recovery in the Kukuska case.
Whereas, reasoned the court, the momentary imminence of the loss
had given rise to the duty in the Kukuska case, here the nature of the
risk involved was such that the applicant's physical disability precluded any showing of actual loss caused by the company's delay. The
Wallace case should not, however, be regarded as a repudiation of the
doctrine of the Kukuska case as the latter might have application to
life, or any other type of insurance. Limited to its own facts, the
Wallace case is obviously just. It would seem, however, that the same
duty to act promptly which is imposed upon one who indemnifies
against loss by hail may be imposed upon one who indemnifies against
loss caused by death, since in each situation actual loss may follow the
insurer's neglect to pass upon the application promptly. 13
The sharp divergences of the courts on theoretical grounds indicate
that no single satisfactory theory for recovery has as yet been advanced,
and that the predication of liability on the insurer has apparently never
been more than morally justified. Undoubtedly the considerations
which have motivated the courts in granting relief are the following:
(a) The insurance company "has pre-empted the field," solicited the
application, received premium payments in most cases, and during the
11 "If we say that it is contractual, that is, that there is an implied agreement under the circumstances on the part of the insurer to act within
a reasonable time; or having a duty to act, the insurer negligently fails in
the performance of that duty; or that the duty springs out of a consensual
relationship, and is therefore in the nature of a quasi-contractual liability, is
not vitally important. Each view finds some support in the cases. It seems to be
more in accord with ordinary legal concepts to say that it is a quasicontractual duty. The legal consequences may be somewhat different in each
case; no doubt that they would be widely variant under a system of pleading
different than that which prevails here. The consequent liability to respond
in damages is the same in each case."
m212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435 (1933).
:1 Actual loss, e.g., may result when the applicant has been approved by the
company's medical examiner as a good "life risk" and meets his death by
accidental means.
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negotiations has been the party making the overtures. Thus it is no
more than just that the company either accept or reject the application
within a reasonable time. (b) The average applicant considers himself "protected" if he receives no notice of the rejection of his application. (c) The bargaining power of the applicant is insignificant in
comparison with that of the insurance company. (d) The social doctrine that insurance companies are better able to bear the loss than the
applicant.
The key to a successful solution of the problem is apparently in
legislative action which will require an insurance company to accept
or reject an application within a specified period or suffer the penalty
of having a contract of insurance declared effective by statutory provision. A North Dakota statute04 incorporating such a provision has
already been declared constitutional. The United States Supreme Court
held that the statute did not interfere with the liberty of insurance
companies to contract, since the freedom of the company to decline to
insure was retained.15 While the North Dakota statute is limited in
effect to hail insurance transactions, it seems that a statute broader in
scope would afford a proper solution of the problem presented in this
note.
GEORGE EGGERS.

1 1 N.D. Comp. Laws (1913)

Sect. 4902: "Every insurance company engaged
in the business of insuring against loss by hail in this state, shall be bound,
and the insurance shall take effect from and after twenty-four hours from
the day and hour the application for such insurance has been taken by the
authorized local agent of said company, and if the company shall decline to
write the insurance upon receipt of the application, it shall forthwith notify the
applicant and agent who took the application by telegram, and in that event
the insurance shall not become effective. Provided, that nothing in this article
shall prevent the company from issuing a policy on such application and
putting the insurance in force prior to the expiration of said twenty-four
hours." Upheld as constitutional in Wanberb v. Fire Ins. Co., 46 N.D. 369
1 179 N.W. 666 (1920).
5 Wanberg v. Fire Ins. Co., 260 U.S. 71, 43 Sup. Ct. 32, 67 Led. 136 (1922).

